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Artificial Intelligence and
the Challenges of Workplace
Discrimination and Privacy
Pauline T. Kim* & Matthew T. Bodie**
Introduction
The term artificial intelligence (AI) was coined in the 1950s, but
the concept has piqued humanity’s interest both before and since.1
Initially relegated to science fiction and futuristic fantasies, recent
technological leaps have made AI commonplace. We rely on these systems every day when we check the weather, read the news, navigate
voice mail, or get directions. These systems also increasingly guide or
replace human decision-making in important domains like medical
care, criminal law enforcement, finance, and employment. These developments raise a number of societal challenges, and numerous scholars
have begun to tackle concerns over the appropriate role of algorithmic
decision-making in our society.2
In the workplace setting, employers are increasingly relying on
artificially intelligent systems to recruit, select, and manage their
workforces. These developments have raised fears that these systems
may subject workers to discriminatory, invasive, or otherwise unfair
treatment. In this article, we review those concerns and provide an
overview of how current laws may apply, focusing on two particular
*
Daniel Noyes Kirby Professor of Law, Washington University School of Law, St.
Louis, Missouri.
**
Callis Family Professor and Co-Director, Wefel Center for Employment Law, Saint
Louis University School of Law. This article originated in presentations at the 72nd
Annual Conference on Labor, “AI and Automation—Impact on Work and Workers,” at the
NYU Center for Labor and Employment Law. Thanks to Laurie Berke-Weiss, Heather
Egan Sussman, and Michael Gray for serving as commentators on our panel.
1. Ryan Calo, Artificial Intelligence Policy: A Primer and Roadmap, 51 U.C. Davis
L. Rev. 399, 401 (2017).
2. See Deborah Hellman, Measuring Algorithmic Fairness, 106 Va. L. Rev. 811,
813–14 (2020) (“The use of algorithms, and in particular their connection with machine
learning and artificial intelligence, has attracted significant attention in the legal literature as well.”). For a small sampling of the literature, see Frank Pasquale, The Black
Box Society (2015); Hannah Bloch-Wehba, Access to Algorithms, 88 Fordham L. Rev. 1265
(2020); Danielle Keats Citron & Frank Pasquale, The Scored Society: Due Process for
Automated Predictions, 89 Wash. L. Rev. 1 (2014); Aziz Z. Huq, A Right to a Human Decision, 106 Va. L. Rev. 611, 613 (2020); Sonia K. Katyal, Private Accountability in the Age of
Artificial Intelligence, 66 UCLA L. Rev. 54 (2019); David Lehr & Paul Ohm, Playing with
the Data: What Legal Scholars Should Learn About Machine Learning, 51 U.C. Davis L.
Rev. 653, 655 (2017).
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problems: discrimination on the basis of protected characteristics like
race, sex, or disability, and the invasion of workers’ privacy engendered
by workplace AI systems. Part I provides a brief background on the
nature of AI and its growing role in the workplace. Part II discusses
the ways in which relying on AI to make personnel decisions can produce discriminatory outcomes and how current law might apply. Part
III explores how these data-driven systems may threaten workers’
interests in privacy and autonomy, and considers the extent to which
existing legal frameworks address these concerns. It also describes the
European Union’s much more restrictive regime as a useful comparator. This article argues that the growing use of AI at work raises significant policy concerns about discrimination, privacy, and autonomy that
are not adequately addressed by current law.
I.

AI and the Workplace
The term artificial intelligence is difficult to define crisply and is
often used interchangeably with other terms such as machine learning, algorithmic decision-making, and automated decision-making.3
Although these terms have somewhat different technical meanings, in
this article we use the term AI loosely to refer to systems that leverage
data-rich inputs and computational techniques to make predictions
that either aid or replace human decision-making. These tools are built
by analyzing large amounts of data to extract patterns and then using
those patterns to predict outcomes in new cases or situations. Some
forms of AI use machine learning techniques, which allow a program to
learn from incoming data over time without humans actively structuring the process. AI systems have the ability to generate insights that
are not accessible based on ordinary human observation, and the more
complex systems may generate results that are not fully explainable or
understandable, even by their human creators.4
Early efforts at artificial intelligence endeavored to make machines
into the equivalent of humans, with the ability to exercise judgment

3. Calo, supra note 1, at 404 (defining AI as “a set of techniques aimed at approximating some aspect of human or animal cognition using machines” and explaining that
“[t]here is no straightforward, consensus definition of artificial intelligence”); Ashley
Deeks, The Judicial Demand for Explainable Artificial Intelligence, 119 Colum. L. Rev.
1829, 1832 (2019) (“Artificial intelligence is a notoriously capacious and slippery term.”);
see Commission White Paper on Artificial Intelligence—A European Approach to Excellence
and Trust, COM (2020) 65 final (Feb. 19, 2020), https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files
/commission-white-paper-artificial-intelligence-feb2020_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/P3KG
-UFEV] (“Simply put, AI is a collection of technologies that combine data, algorithms and
computing power.”).
4. Calo, supra note 1, at 402 (noting that “a vast increase in computational power
and access to training data has led to practical breakthroughs in machine learning, a
singularly important branch of AI”); Deeks, supra note 3, at 1829 (“A recurrent concern
about machine learning algorithms is that they operate as ‘black boxes.’”).
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in a variety of contexts.5 These efforts to create a “general” AI have
largely failed.6 However, there have been great successes in narrow
AI—namely, the application of artificial intelligence to a particular
problem or context.7 Familiar examples of AI breakthroughs include
programs that play games such as chess and Go; speech-recognition
programs that translate speech to text; and spam filters for email
accounts.8 Increasingly, AI systems are being used in social domains
as well—for example, to make decisions regarding policing, bail, credit,
and employment.9 As these AI tools are deployed in arenas with significant human and societal impacts, concerns have been raised about the
fairness, accountability, and transparency of these systems.10 Fairness
centers on the risk of “discriminatory or unjust impacts when comparing across different demographics or affected communities and individuals.”11 Accountability refers to the need to take responsibility for
the use of AI and the effects of that use, including the need to mitigate
negative impacts on society.12 Transparency concerns relate to failures
to disclose when AI is used to make decisions and to explain how it
reaches those decisions.13
The use of AI in the workplace raises specific apprehensions. Much
recent attention has focused on whether workers will be replaced by
AI or other new forms of technology, such as automation and robotics.14
5. Future of Privacy Forum, The Privacy Expert’s Guide to Artificial Intelligence
Machine Learning 5 (2018), https://fpf.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/FPF_Artificial
-Intelligence_Digital.pdf [https://perma.cc/949W-QHL4] [hereinafter FPF Expert’s Guide].
6. See id. at 5–6.
7. Id. at 6; Calo, supra note 1, at 405 (“An important consequence of the shift was
that researchers began to try to solve specific problems or master particular ‘domains,’
such as converting speech to text or playing chess, instead of pursuing a holistic intelligence capable of performing every cognitive task within one system.”).
8. FPF Expert’s Guide, supra note 5, at 6; Alison DeNisco Rayome, Why IBM’s
Speech Recognition Breakthrough Matters for AI and IoT, TechRepublic (Mar. 13, 2017,
9:39 AM), https://www.techrepublic.com/article/why-ibms-speech-recognition-breakthrough-matters-for-ai-and-iot [https://perma.cc/F9SH-HSQF]. The speed of advancement just in the last five years has taken some observers by surprise. See Cynthia
Estlund, What Should We Do After Work? Automation and Employment Law, 128 Yale
L.J. 254, 265–66 (2018) (discussing the leap forward in natural language translation in
2016).
9. See, e.g., Elizabeth E. Joh, Artificial Intelligence and Policing: Hints in the Carpenter Decision, 16 Ohio St. J. Crim. L. 281, 283–84 (2018); Tom C.W. Lin, Artificial Intelligence, Finance, and the Law, 88 Fordham L. Rev. 531, 532 (2019); William Magnuson,
Artificial Financial Intelligence, 10 Harv. Bus. L. Rev. 337, 340–41 (2020); Andrew D.
Selbst, Disparate Impact in Big Data Policing, 52 Ga. L. Rev. 109, 113–14 (2017); Crystal
S. Yang & Will Dobbie, Equal Protection Under Algorithms: A New Statistical and Legal
Framework, 119 Mich. L. Rev. 291 (2020).
10. Pasquale, supra note 2, at 3–11; Citron & Pasquale, supra note 2.
11. FPF Expert’s Guide, supra note 5, at 22.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. See Erik Brynjolfsson & Andrew McAfee, The Second Machine Age: Work,
Progress, and Prosperity in a Time of Brilliant Technologies 126–28 (2014); Frank
Pasquale, Data-Informed Duties in AI Development, 119 Colum. L. Rev. 1917, 1917 (2019)
and
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Worry about technology replacing human labor is not new, but there is
a lively ongoing debate about whether advances in AI will cause disruptions on a greater scale than in the past.15 Although this question
is clearly important, this article focuses instead on the policy concerns
that arise when employers use AI tools to manage workers, rather than
replace them.
Employers have adopted artificial intelligence systems to assist in
a variety of personnel and management functions.16 AI tools are used
to screen employment applicants and evaluate potential candidates for
positions.17 Employers have also used AI to determine which employees
might be more likely to leave the company. Data analytics have found
correlations between a higher risk of flight and such factors as time
interacting with colleagues, meeting attendance, and waiver of benefits coverage.18 Employers can then use these predictions to make a
stronger effort at retention or to steer likely-to-depart employees away
from sensitive projects. Across the board, employers are using AI to
help manage their workforce—in some cases, even doing the work of
management.19 This includes turning to AI applications in response
to the COVID-19 pandemic. For example, security cameras outfitted

(“Corporations will increasingly attempt to substitute artificial intelligence (AI) and
robotics for human labor.”); Kevin J. Delaney, The Robot That Takes Your Job Should Pay
Taxes, Says Bill Gates, Quartz.com (Feb. 17, 2017), https://qz.com/911968/bill-gates-therobot-that-takes-your-job-should-pay-taxes [https://perma.cc/D3SD-3JXK].
15. Compare Estlund, supra note 8, at 264 (“[B]ecause emerging technologies are
able to replicate or surpass a wider swath of human capabilities, there is more reason
this time around to expect job destruction to outpace job creation.”), with H. James Wilson & Paul R. Daugherty, Collaborative Intelligence: Humans and AI Are Joining Forces,
Harv. Bus. Rev. (July– Aug. 2018), https://hbr.org/2018/07/collaborative-intelligence
-humans-and-ai-are-joining-forces [https://perma.cc/Z8AK-WJDH] (“While AI will radically alter how work gets done and who does it, the technology’s larger impact will be in
complementing and augmenting human capabilities, not replacing them.”).
16. Miranda Bogen & Aaron Rieke, Upturn, Help Wanted: An Examination of Hiring
Algorithms, Equity, and Bias 3 (2018), https://www.upturn.org/static/reports/2018/hiring
-algorithms/files/Upturn%20--%20Help%20Wanted%20-%20An%20Exploration%20
of%20Hiring%20Algorithms,%20Equity%20and%20Bias.pdf.
17. See, e.g., Ifeoma Ajunwa, Beware of Automated Hiring, N.Y. Times (Oct. 8, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/08/opinion/ai-hiring-discrimination.html [https://perma
.cc/4YKD-9A4E]; Chris Opfer, AI Hiring Could Mean Robot Discrimination Will Head
to Courts, Daily Lab. Rep. (BL) (Nov. 12, 2019, 5:01 AM), https://news.bloomberglaw
.com/daily-labor-report/ai-hiring-could-mean-robot-discrimination-will-head-to-courts
[https://perma.cc/WCP2-H2E2].
18. Rachel Emma Silverman & Nikki Waller, The Algorithm That Tells the Boss
Who Might Quit, Wall St. J. (Mar. 13, 2015, 7:05 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/the
-algorithm-that-tells-the-boss-who-might-quit-1426287935 [https://perma.cc/4EE3-4NB4].
19. Vegard Kolbjørnsrud, Richard Amico & Robert J. Thomas, How Artificial Intelligence Will Redefine Management, Harv. Bus. Rev. (Nov. 2, 2016), https://hbr.org/2016/11
/how-artificial-intelligence-will-redefine-management [https://perma.cc/NK42-J46J] (“The
fact is, artificial intelligence will soon be able to do the administrative tasks that consume much of managers’ time faster, better, and at a lower cost.”).
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with AI scanners have monitored employees for mask use and social
distancing.20
Objections to the use of AI within the employment relationship
have largely fallen into two categories. First, there has been significant
concern that the AI may reflect, reinforce, or worsen discriminatory
biases when making employment decisions. Algorithms can produce
predictions that systematically disadvantage workers along the lines
of race, sex, or other protected characteristics.21 The risk is that these
discriminatory outcomes will be overlooked or ignored because of the
mistaken belief that AI processes are “objective” and “neutral.” Second,
the introduction of AI may bring employees into a vortex of massive
information collection, data vulnerability, and seemingly whimsical
decision-making. Employees report a feeling of powerlessness when
AI is given significant power over their jobs, as they lose the ability
to interact with their “supervisor” in a meaningful way.22 The voracious maw of data collection paired with the inexplicability of decisions
made can create the feeling that the employee is trapped in a matrix of
computer-controlled reality from which there is no escape.23 In the
next two sections we explain these concerns and examine the extent to
which existing law addresses them.
II. AI and Employment Discrimination
When an employer uses AI tools to make or to aid decisions about
recruitment, hiring, and promotion, they can have a significant impact
on access to employment opportunities. The promise of these technologies is that they will make these HR processes fairer and less discriminatory.24 Human decision-makers often harbor explicit or implicit
20. Rani Molla, 10 Ways Office Work Will Never Be the Same, Recode, (Mar. 23, 2021,
8:20 AM), https://www.vox.com/recode/22331447/10-ways-office-work-pandemic-futureremote-work [https://perma.cc/P72F-N8TS]; Matthew Wille, Employers Are Turning to
AI to Enforce Social Distancing for COVID-19, Input (Apr. 28, 2020, 11:01 AM), https://
www.inputmag.com/tech/employers-are-turning-to-ai-to-enforce-social-distancing-covid
-19-coronavirus[https://perma.cc/CU4Q-YSHA].
21. See Dave Gershgorn, Companies Are on the Hook If Their Hiring Algorithms
Are Biased, Quartz (Oct. 22, 2018), https://qz.com/1427621/companies-are-on-the-hook
-if-their-hiring-algorithms-are-biased [https://perma.cc/WM4W-NNBM] (discussing Amazon test program that consistently chose men over women for positions).
22. Ifeoma Ajunwa, Kate Crawford & Jason Schultz, Limitless Worker Surveillance,
105 Calif. L. Rev. 735, 737 (2017) (“Employees’ suspicion that OccupEye’s true purpose
was mass surveillance of worker performance quickly led to public outrage, union pressure, and, ultimately, its ejection from the Telegraph building.”).
23. Deeks, supra note 3, at 1829 (“Because these algorithms repeatedly adjust the
way that they weigh inputs to improve the accuracy of their predictions, it can be difficult
to identify how and why the algorithms reach the outcomes they do.”); Andrew D. Selbst
& Solon Barocas, The Intuitive Appeal of Explainable Machines, 87 Fordham L. Rev. 1085,
1087 (2018) (“The results of these algorithms can be unnerving, unfair, unsafe, unpredictable, and unaccountable.”).
24. See, e.g., Claire Cain Miller, Can an Algorithm Hire Better Than a Human?, N.Y.
Times: The Upshot (June 25, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/26/upshot/can
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biases, which can unfairly disadvantage racial minorities, women, and
other disadvantaged groups,25 and technology might help to avoid those
human biases.
Despite their aura of neutrality and objectivity, however, AI tools
can also reproduce human biases or introduce new forms of bias,
depending upon how such tools are built and trained. Studies have
documented a number of examples of algorithmic bias. For example,
Internet searches for black-identified names are more likely to be
accompanied by ads suggesting an arrest record (e.g., “Latanya Sweeney, arrested?”),26 than searches for white-identified names, even when
no arrest record exists.27 In another well-known example, Amazon
tried to create an algorithm to screen potential candidates for software
developer jobs, but abandoned the effort after finding that it systematically downgraded qualified female applicants.28
Importantly, these types of discriminatory outcomes cannot be
prevented simply by removing protected attributes like race or gender
from the algorithms.29 When AI tools are built using data-rich profiles,
they can end up relying on proxies for a protected characteristic. For
example, because place of residence is closely correlated with race in
many cities, an algorithm that sorts candidates based on zip code could
disadvantage racial minorities. This might occur intentionally when
a proxy is used to screen out a disfavored group, but the effect could
be unintentional as well because attributes can be correlated with
protected characteristics in unexpected ways. For example, certain
-an-algorithm-hire-better-than-a-human.html [https://perma.cc/PKM6-4JY4]; Matt
Richtel, How Big Data Is Playing Recruiter for Specialized Workers, N.Y. Times (Apr. 27,
2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/28/technology/how-big-data-is-playing-recruiter
forspecialized-workers.html [https://perma.cc/XAF6-SKXC]; Dustin Volz, Silicon Valley
Thinks It Has the Answer to Its Diversity Problem, Atlantic (Sept. 26, 2014), http://www
.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2014/09/silicon-valley-thinks-it-has-the-answer-to-its
-diversity-problem/431334 [https://perma.cc/VA6N-6W53].
25. For a few of the many articles documenting human bias in the employment
process, see Jerry Kang & Kristine Lane, Seeing Through Colorblindness: Implicit Bias
and the Law, 58 UCLA L. Rev. 465, 468–89 (2010); Linda Krieger, The Content of Our
Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 Stan. L. Rev. 1161, 1186–88 (1995); Anthony G. Greenwald & Linda Hamilton
Krieger, Implicit Bias: Scientific Foundations, 94 Calif. L. Rev. 945, 946 (2006); R. Richard Banks, Jennifer L. Eberhardt & Lee Ross, Discrimination and Implicit Bias in a
Racially Unequal Society, 94 Calif. L. Rev. 1169, 1170 (2006).
26. Latanya Sweeney is a prominent computer scientist and professor at Harvard
University. She conducted the study documenting this effect after a colleague notified
her that such an ad had appeared when he had Googled her name.
27. Latanya Sweeney, Discrimination in Online Ad Delivery, Commc’ns ACM, May
2013, at 44, 46–47.
28. Jeffrey Dastin, Amazon Scraps Secret AI Recruiting Tool That Showed Bias
Against Women, Reuters (Oct. 10, 2018, 6:04 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article
/us-amazon-com-jobs-automation-insight/amazon-scraps-secret-ai-recruiting-tool-that
-showed-bias-against-women-idUSKCN1MK08G [https://perma.cc/T6NZ-T4ZW].
29. See Solon Barocas & Andrew D. Selbst, Big Data’s Disparate Impact, 104 Calif.
L. Rev. 671, 674 (2016).
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patterns of consumption could be correlated with health conditions,
causing an algorithm to implicitly discriminate against individuals
with disabilities, even if the employer neither knows nor intends to
screen on that basis.30
AI can also produce biased results if it is trained using biased
data.31 An algorithm trained using the subjective evaluations of a
biased supervisor will make systematically biased predictions of future
job performance. Similarly, a hiring algorithm that selects candidates
by comparing them with an employer’s current employees may discriminate if the employer’s past practices excluded certain groups. If,
for example, the employer has very few women working as computer
programmers, the algorithm will likely reproduce that pattern when
trying to predict the most promising hires. Similarly, an algorithm that
tried to maximize “cultural fit” by recommending applicants who are
similar to current employees could operate to exclude racial or ethnic
minorities.32
Other data problems can also produce biased outcomes. If the data
used to train the AI is less complete or less accurate for some groups,
the algorithm will be less accurate in identifying the most promising
candidates from that group or may systematically underestimate their
likelihood of success. Similarly, if the training data are unrepresentative of the population to which that the algorithm will be applied,
it could systematically disadvantage protected groups, even if neither the creator of the algorithm nor the employer using it intends to
discriminate.
The risks of biased AI can even affect the diversity of the applicant pool before the employer has a chance to evaluate job candidates.33
Today, employers rely heavily on online platforms to advertise job
openings and recruit strong applicants. Those platforms, however, do
not simply disseminate job postings widely.34 Instead, they rely on AI
to predict who is most likely to respond to a particular opportunity, and
those predictions will often reflect past patterns of occupational seg30. See Alex Engler, For Some Employment Algorithms, Disability Discrimination by
Default, Brookings (Oct. 31, 2019), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/techtank/2019/10/31
/for-some-employment-algorithms-disability-discrimination-by-default [https://perma.cc
/M7RS-MW5C].
31. For systematic discussions of how algorithms can produce biased results, see
Barocas & Selbst, supra note 29, at 674; Pauline T. Kim, Data-Driven Discrimination at
Work, 58 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 857, 874, 887, 891 (2017) [hereinafter Kim, Data-Driven
Discrimination]; David Lehr & Paul Ohm, Playing with the Data: What Legal Scholars
Should Learn About Machine Learning, 51 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 653, 703–04 (2017).
32. Ifeoma Ajunwa, The Paradox of Automation as Anti-Bias Intervention, 41 Cardozo L. Rev. 1671, 1713 (2020).
33. Bogen & Rieke, supra note 16, at 5–6.
34. Muhammad Ali, Piotr Sapiezynski, Miranda Bogen, Aleksandra Korolova, Alan
Mislove & Aaron Rieke, Discrimination Through Optimization: How Facebook’s Ad Delivery Can Lead to Biased Outcomes, 3 Proc. ACM on Hum.-Comput. Interaction 1 (2019).
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regation.35 Studies have documented that ads delivered on Facebook
for stereotypically male jobs (e.g., lumberjack, AI researcher, truck
driver) are overwhelmingly targeted at male users, even though the
advertising was intended to reach a gender-balanced audience.36 Other
types of ads were served to race- or age-biased audiences—again, in
ways that appear to reflect stereotypes about the kinds of people who
fill those jobs.37
These risks of discriminatory effects arise because AI learns to
make predictions by analyzing data about past patterns of behavior.
In the employment sphere, those patterns may reflect prior discrimination, as, for example, when women are paid less to do the same
job38 or are discouraged from pursuing certain occupations by on-thejob harassment. The American labor market has long been characterized by patterns of occupational segregation along race and gender
lines.39 As a result, relying on the past to make predictions about the
future runs the risk of reproducing past discrimination if care is not
taken when building AI tools.40 To avoid inadvertently encoding past
biases, the designers who build AI systems and the employers who use
them may want to take actions to counter discriminatory effects that
might otherwise occur. For example, it will often be important to audit
algorithmic systems for unintended discriminatory effects and make
adjustments, if necessary, to avoid unfairness.41
Given the risks of discriminatory outcomes, the growing use of AI
tools in the workplace raises a number of legal questions. Federal laws
prohibit discrimination on the basis of race, color, and other protected
characteristics.42 These laws are relevant when algorithms are used to
35. Pauline T. Kim, Manipulating Opportunity, 106 Va. L. Rev. 867, 881 (2020).
36. Piotr Sapiezynski, Avijit Ghosh, Levi Kaplan, Alan Mislove & Aaron Rieke,
Algorithms That “Don’t See Color”: Comparing Biases in Lookalike and Special Ad
Audiences, arXiv (Dec. 17, 2019), https://arxiv.org/pdf/-1912.07579.pdf [https://perma
.cc/HG3E-NLCY]; Ava Kofman & Ariana Tobin, Facebook Ads Can Still Discriminate
Against Women and Older Workers, Despite a Civil Rights Settlement, ProPublica (Dec. 13,
2019, 5:00 AM), https://www.propublica.org/article/facebook-ads-can-still-discriminate
-against-women-and-older-workers-despite-a-civil-rights-settlement [https://perma.cc
/F3YU-HCTQ].
37. Ali et al., supra note 34, at 8; Kofman & Tobin, supra note 36.
38. Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618, 622 (2007).
39. Kevin Stainback & Donald Tomaskovic-Devey, Documenting Desegregation:
Racial and Gender Segregation in Private-Sector Employment Since the Civil Rights
Act 7 (2012).
40. Kim, Manipulating Opportunity, supra note 35, at 892.
41. Pauline T. Kim, Auditing Algorithms for Discrimination, 166 Univ. Pa.
L. Rev. Online 189, 190 (2017), https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent
.cgi?article=1212&context=penn_law_review_online.
42. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 expressly forbids discrimination based
on race, color, religion, national origin and sex, Civil Rights Act of 1964 §§ 703–716, 42
U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-15, and the Supreme Court recently interpreted its prohibitions to extend to sexual orientation and gender identity discrimination as well, Bostock v. Clayton Cty., Georgia, 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1743 (2020). The Age Discrimination in
Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–634, the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C.
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make employment decisions, and in some circumstances their application is clear. In other cases, however, it may be quite uncertain how
existing laws apply to AI tools.
Consider first employers that use online platforms to advertise
job openings. Title VII, in addition to prohibiting discrimination, also
makes it unlawful for employers to publish advertisements that “indicate a preference, limitation, specification or discrimination” based on
a forbidden characteristic.43 A similar provision in the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) prohibits ads indicating a preference based on age.44 These provisions would likely apply if an employer
deliberately tried to target its ads using attributes that either directly
or by proxy excluded members of a protected group.45
However, as discussed above, even neutrally targeted job postings
can be delivered in biased ways because of the operation of algorithms
deployed by online platforms. If an employer intends to reach a broad
audience, but the platform’s algorithm distributes the opportunity in a
biased way, is the platform responsible? Title VII’s prohibitions apply
to employment agencies in addition to employers and labor organizations, but few cases have interpreted that provision. If a tech platform
actively intervenes to suggest or promote certain candidates or opportunities, or to facilitate certain matches, we argue that it should be
treated as an “employment agency” under Title VII.46 Other platforms
may not have enough direct control over access to employment opportunities to be covered by the statute.
What about hiring algorithms that sort or score job applicants?
Does an algorithm that systematically disadvantages members of
a protected group violate the law? Title VII encompasses two wellrecognized theories of discrimination: disparate treatment and disparate impact. Disparate treatment theory forbids adverse decisions
§§ 12101–12117, and the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000ff,
protect against discrimination on the basis of age, disability, and genetic information,
respectively.
43. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–3(b).
44. 29 U.S.C. § 623(e).
45. Pauline T. Kim & Sharion Scott, Discrimination in Online Employment Recruiting, 63 St. Louis Univ. L. J. 93, 94 (2018). The settlement in 2019 of a lawsuit against
Facebook makes it more difficult for employers to deliberately target its ads on that platform in a way that excludes protected groups. Galen Sherwin & Esha Bhandari, Facebook
Settles Civil Rights Cases by Making Sweeping Changes to Its Online Ad Platform, ACLU
(Mar. 19, 2019, 2:00 PM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/womens-rights/womens-rights-work
place/facebook-settles-civil-rights-cases-making-sweeping [https://perma.cc/H6D6-UMJ4].
Pursuant to the settlement, Facebook agreed to require employment, housing, and credit
advertisements to be placed through a special portal that restricts the options for targeting these types of ads. Although the restrictions will make it more difficult to deliberately exclude an audience based on a protected characteristic, doing so is still possible.
Kim, Manipulating Opportunity, supra note 35, at 890–91; see also Miriam A. Cherry,
Age Discrimination in the On-Demand Economy and Crowdwork, 40 Berkeley J. Emp. &
Lab. L. 29, 56–57 (2019).
46. See, Kim, Manipulating Opportunity, supra note 35, at 913.
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taken “because of” race, sex, or any other protected class.47 If an
employer is using a biased algorithm because it wants to screen out
members of a protected group, that is clearly a form of intentional discrimination prohibited under disparate treatment theory. Proving the
employer’s intent may be difficult, but that type of discrimination fits
quite well conceptually with the disparate treatment theory.
Disparate impact cases involve facially neutral employment practices that have discriminatory effects.48 Under current Title VII doctrine, disparate impact cases proceed through several steps.49 First,
the plaintiff must identify an employer practice that has a disparate
impact on a protected group.50 Then, the employer can defend the practice by showing that it is “job related” and “consistent with business
necessity.”51 If the employer succeeds in this defense, the plaintiff can
still prevail by showing that a less discriminatory alternative exists
and that the employer failed to adopt it.52
When AI selection tools disproportionately screen out women
or racial minorities from an applicant pool, disparate impact theory
would seem to apply. This means employers should closely monitor
how AI tools operate in practice and should not use them, or should
discontinue using them, if they have a disparate impact unless they
are clearly job-related and consistent with business necessity. Applying these standards, however, raises a number of questions. In the
past, employers defending selection procedures by validating that they
actually measured job-relevant skills or attributes.53 AI tools, however,
often rely on unexplained correlations with observable attributes to
make predictions about an individual’s future behavior or job performance. The variable relied on by the algorithm may have no intuitive
connection with performance, and, in some cases, the relationship
may be purely correlational and obviously lack any causal connection
to the relevant skills or abilities. As examples, it was documented in
one dataset that computer programmers who frequented a particular
Japanese manga site had superior coding skills, while another study
47. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).
48. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429–30 (1971); see also 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2(k).
49. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(k).
50. Id. § 2000e–2(k)(1)(A).
51. Id. § 2000e–2(k)(1)(A)(i).
52. Id. § 2000e–2(k)(1)(A)(ii). The ADEA and the ADA do not have provisions comparable to 703(k), which sets out these shifting burdens, but they do contain language
authorizing disparate impact claims based on age and disability. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(2);
42 U.S.C. §12112(b)(3). Some courts, however, have held that disparate impact claims by
applicants, as opposed to current employees, are not available under the ADEA. Kleber
v. CareFusion Corp., 914 F.3d 480, 480 (7th Cir. 2019); Villarreal v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco
Co., 839 F.3d 958, 970 (11th Cir. 2016).
53. Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures, 29 C.F.R. § 1607.15
(2020).
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found that users in the United Kingdom who “like” curly fries on Facebook had higher intelligence.54 Some types of AI use machine learning
techniques where the AI tools “learn” by extracting patterns from the
data, rather than the programmer deciding what factors are relevant
and what weights to give them. The resulting algorithms are often
exceedingly complex and completely opaque, such that it is difficult for
humans to interpret. As a consequence, employers that rely on these
types of algorithms may not be able to clearly articulate or explain the
reasons for their personnel decisions. Applying existing employment
discrimination law to AI tools will require addressing these challenges.
When Congress codified the disparate impact doctrine in in section 703(k) of Title VII, it retained the language in section 703(a)(2),
which makes it an unlawful employment practice for an employer “to
limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive” them of
opportunities because of one of the listed protected characteristics.55
This statutory language arguably continues to have independent force
and could serve as a basis for scrutinizing AI systems that sort or
screen—i.e., “classify”—employees or applicants in biased ways, and
for ensuring that disparate impact theory meets the novel challenges
that they pose.56
For discrimination law to remain effective, it must recognize the
specific ways in which biased AI can unfairly discriminate.57 For example, the mere existence of a statistical correlation should not be sufficient to justify a model with discriminatory effects. In other words,
an unexplained correlation should not satisfy the requirement that an
employer show that a practice is “job related.”58 In addition, when an
algorithm systematically disadvantages protected groups, the employer
should bear the burden of demonstrating that the model is statistically
valid and substantively meaningful, as opposed to merely “job related.”
The employer, or the vendor who created the algorithm, should have
to demonstrate that it avoids common sources of statistical bias—for
54. Don Peck, They’re Watching You at Work, Atlantic (Dec. 2013), https://www.the
atlantic.com/magazine/archive/2013/12/theyre-watching-you-at-work/354681 [perma.cc
/MAG2-UFAQ]; Michal Kosinski, David Stillwell & Thore Graepel, Private Traits and
Attributes Are Predictable from Digital Records of Human Behavior, 110 Proc. Nat’l
Acad. Sci. U.S. 5802, 5805 (2013).
55. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2), Parallel language appears in the ADEA, 29 U.S.C.
§ 623(a)(2), although it omits “applicants.” The ADA defines discrimination to include
use of criteria that “have the effect of discrimination,” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(3)(a), which
authorizes disparate impact cases. Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44, 53 (2003).
56. Kim, Data-Driven Discrimination, supra note 31, at 857, 916–17.
57. Id. at 886–87.
58. The problem with relying on pure correlations is that the relationship between
two variables may not be stable over time. A correlation in the past may not hold true in
the future, which means that applicants could be denied an opportunity on what turns
out to be an arbitrary, irrelevant basis.
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example, by showing that it was built using data that is accurate, unbiased, and representative. In addition, the employer should have to provide some explanation of the decision process and explain its relevance
to the job—something more than a mere statistical relationship. Only
then can we bring to bear societal values and judgments to determine
whether an algorithm’s use is justified despite its effects.
Under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), employers are
prohibited from using tests or selection criteria “that screen out or tend
to screen out” individuals with disabilities unless the test or criterion
is job-related and consistent with business necessity.59 The statute also
forbids the use of tests that work as obstacles to applicants or employees with sensory, manual, or speaking impairments, such that they
“reflect the impaired sensory, manual, or speaking skills,” rather than
the actual skills or aptitude necessary to perform the job.60 In other
words, employers must be careful when adopting AI screening tools,
especially ones that collect data about applicants through interactive
online tests or games, that the tools are not preventing or disadvantaging applicants with disabilities that may make it more difficult for
them to interact online. If that is the case, employers may need to make
reasonable accommodations for those applicants.
Employers who make use of AI tools in their HR processes should
be aware of the potential risks of bias and take proactive steps to avoid
them. Doing so requires careful scrutiny of the manner in which these
tools are designed and built, and how they will be deployed in a particular workplace. A number of checklists or principles now offer guidance
to employers on avoiding bias when using AI tools. For example, the
Leadership Conference on Civil and Human Rights has promulgated
Principles for Hiring Assessment Technologies.61 In addition, because
algorithms that appear to be unbiased under testing conditions may
behave differently “in the wild,” employers should engage in regular
auditing of the performance of these tools once they have been implemented.62 If a screening or hiring tool has an unexpected disparate
impact on disadvantaged groups, it should be scrutinized and adjusted
to avoid any unfairness.
Such an approach is consistent with the Supreme Court’s repeated
admonition that voluntary compliance by employers is “the preferred
means of achieving the objectives of Title VII.”63 Although a few
59. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(6).
60. Id. § 12112(b)(7).
61. Leadership Conf. Educ. Fund et al., Civil Rights Principles for Hiring Assessment Technologies (2020), http://civilrightsdocs.info/pdf/policy/letters/2020/Hiring
_Principles_FINAL_7.29.20.pdf.
62. See generally Kim, supra note 41.
63. Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 581 (2009) (quoting Local No. 93, Int’l Ass’n of
Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 510, 515 (1986)).
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commenters have suggested that the Court’s decision in Ricci v. DeStefano64 somehow bars employers from revising algorithmic processes
after the fact to correct for discrimination,65 this belief stems from a
misreading of Ricci.66 The Supreme Court in that case disapproved of
a city’s decision to discard the results of a promotion exam when it
turned out to have a racially disparate impact. Numerous firefighters
had expended significant time and resources studying for the exam,
and its decision to discard the results adversely affected them because
they had relied on the city’s announced plan to use it for promotions.67
In contrast, the Court made clear that Title VII does not prohibit an
employer from prospectively designing its employment practices “in
order to provide a fair opportunity for all individuals, regardless of
their race.”68 Thus, it is clearly lawful for an employer to implement
a new testing protocol or selection procedure in the future to create a
more fair process.69
III. AI and Employee Privacy and Autonomy
In addition to assisting with traditional HR functions, AI tools are
also increasingly integrated into work tasks. These tools can offer enormous benefits by helping workers perform their jobs more productively.70 At the same time, widespread integration of AI into the workplace
typically entails the collection and analysis of large amounts of data,
much of it harvested from employees. This massive data collection in
turn creates new power that employers can use to manage and control workers.71 As a result, the increasing use of AI at the workplace
raises concerns about privacy and autonomy. AI threatens employee
privacy by requiring the collection and processing of huge amounts of
employee data. And when AI systems make decisions with important
employment ramifications in the absence of transparency or accountability, workers can be left feeling powerless and alienated. Although
these issues are not new, the growing use of AI tools vastly expands
64. 557 U.S. 557 (2009).
65. See, e.g., Joshua A. Kroll, Joanna Huey, Solon Barocas, Edward W. Felten, Joel
R. Reidenberg, David G. Robinson & Harlan Yu, Accountable Algorithms, 165 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 633, 692 (2017).
66. See Kim, supra note 41, at 197–202 (explaining why Ricci does not prohibit
employers from correcting algorithms that cause biased outcomes).
67. Ricci, 557 U.S. at 583–84.
68. Id. at 585.
69. See, e.g., Maraschiello v. City of Buffalo Police Dep’t, 709 F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 2013);
Carroll v. City of Mount Vernon, 707 F. Supp. 2d 449 (S.D.N.Y. 2010), aff’d, 453 F. App’x
99 (2d Cir. 2011).
70. See Wilson & Daugherty, supra note 15 (discussing collaborations between
workers and AI).
71. Ellyn Shook, Eva Sage-Gavin & Susan Cantrell, How Companies Can Use
Employee Data Responsibly, Harv. Bus. Rev. (Feb. 15, 2019), https://hbr.org/2019/02/how
-companies-can-use-employee-data-responsibly [perma.cc/SP5N-DKQU].
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the challenges they pose, and, to this point, the law provides very few
mechanisms for directly addressing them.
A.

Collection and Use of Employee Data
Data obtained through employee surveillance fuels AI.72 The
development of artificial intelligence builds on systems that cull and
process massive amounts of data. AI tools require these large datasets
in order to learn patterns that allow them to make artificially intelligent decisions. For example, natural language processing systems
require exposure to enormous samples of human communications to
analyze and learn to imitate those communications.73 As AI is increasingly incorporated into the workplace, it must rely on data produced
by humans—employees—for the raw material needed to build tools
that will be useful in that setting. At the same time, new technologies
have made monitoring employees and collecting data from them much
more inexpensive, unobtrusive, and comprehensive. Employers can
track employee movements,74 follow their activities on the web,75 and
even monitor employees’ heart rate and blood pressure76 with everyday technology integrated with ordinary consumer devices.77 Artificial
intelligence can then crunch this data in a variety of ways, producing
insights that are unique or unexpected. Below we discuss the ways in
which the United States and the European Union regulate workplace
data collection and processing.

72. Calo, supra note 1, at 405 (“The recent explosion of [AI] efficacy comes from a
combination of much faster computers and much more data.”); Jeffrey M. Hirsch, Future
Work, 2020 Univ. Ill. L. Rev. 889, 897 (“To learn in a sufficiently accurate manner, AI
programs not only require massive amounts of data, but data that is organized in precise
ways.”).
73. For example, the pool of emails taken from Enron by the federal government and
released to the public, known as the Enron Corpus, has been critical in developing speechand language-related AI. See Jessica Leber, The Immortal Life of the Enron E-Mails,
MIT Tech. Rev. (July 2, 2013), https://www.technologyreview.com/2013/07/02/177506/the
-immortal-life-of-the-enron-e-mails [perma.cc/GTC7-5JR6].
74. See, e.g., David Kravets, Worker Fired for Disabling GPS App That Tracked
Her 24 Hours a Day, Ars Technica (May 11, 2015, 9:41 AM), http://arstechnica.com/tech
-policy/2015/05/worker-fired-for-disabling-gps-app-that-tracked-her-24-hours-a-day
[https://perma.cc/476P-L94B].
75. Frank Pasquale, The Other Big Brother, Atlantic (Sept. 21, 2015), https://
www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2015/09/corporate-surveillance-activists/406201
[perma.cc/8QMW-2VYX] (“Employers are monitoring keystrokes, tones of voice, and
faces, all in the name of predictive analytics.”).
76. Christopher Rowland, With Fitness Trackers in the Workplace, Bosses Can Monitor Your Every Step—and Possibly More, Wash. Post (Feb. 16, 2019, 6:13 PM), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/with-fitness-trackers-in-the-workplace
-bosses-can-monitor-your-every-step--and-possibly-more/2019/02/15/75ee0848-2a45
-11e9-b011-d8500644dc98_story.html [perma.cc/JAJ6-S2DP].
77. Stephen Baker, Managing by the Numbers, Businessweek, Sept. 8, 2008, at 32, 34.

LaborAndEmployment_June21.indd 302

8/11/21 9:53 AM

Artificial Intelligence  303
1. Employee Privacy Protections Under Current U.S. Law
Commentators have bemoaned the relatively weak constraints
that U.S. law places on employer collection and use of workers’ data.78 A
patchwork of variegated protections creates only a loose set of restrictions.79 In this part we briefly survey existing legal regulations that
touch on employee privacy concerns.
General Protections for Employee Privacy. Only a handful of sources
of law offer broad privacy rights, and they provide quite limited protections to employees. The Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution
protects public-sector employees against unreasonable searches and
seizures,80 but these federal rights only constrain government employers.81 In addition, because the methods of massive data collection often
do not involve a search or seizure, it is unclear the extent to which
constitutional provisions apply in this context.82
The privacy tort of intrusion upon seclusion83 also provides a type
of generalized privacy protection, and it is recognized by courts in over
forty states.84 The intrusion tort has provided redress from a variety
of privacy invasions by employers, such as spying on an employee
78. See, e.g., Ajunwa, Crawford & Schultz, supra note 22, at 772; Leora Eisenstadt,
Data Analytics and the Erosion of the Work/Nonwork Divide, 56 Am. Bus. L.J. 445, 447
(2019); J.S. Nelson, Management Culture and Surveillance, 43 Seattle Univ. L. Rev. 631,
634 (2020).
79. Alan F. Westin, Privacy in the Workplace: How Well Does American Law Reflect
American Values?, 72 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 271, 282–83 (1996) (“[T]he U.S. approach to
privacy remains a more eclectic blend of constitutional interpretation, pin-pointed and
sector-specific legislation, sector-based administrative agency rules, common-law
judicial interpretation, labor-management bargaining (where employees are unionrepresented), voluntary organizational policies, and market-based dynamics.”).
80. . See, e.g., O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 725–26 (1987); City of Ontario v.
Quon, 560 U.S. 746, 756–57 (2010).
81. Cf. Pauline T. Kim, Privacy Rights, Public Policy, and the Employment Relationship, 57 Ohio St. L.J. 671, 674 n.17 (1996) (“In rare cases, where a private employer is
acting as an instrument or agent of the government, constitutional privacy protections
may extend to workers in the private sector.”). Only a handful of states have constitutional or statutory provisions that provide general privacy protections for private sector
employees. For example, California’s constitutional privacy provision applies to private
actors. Cal. Const. art. I, § 1 (providing for “inalienable rights” including “pursuing and
obtaining safety, happiness, and privacy”); Hill v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 865 P.2d
633, 642–44 (Cal. 1994) (holding that the state’s constitutional right of privacy extends
to private actors, including private-sector employers); see also Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 214,
§ 1B (2018); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 20-203 (2019); R.I. Gen. Laws § 9-1-28.1(a)(1) (2019); Wisc.
Stat. Ann. § 995.50(2)(a) (2019).
82. The Constitution has also been thought to protect informational privacy,
although the existence of such a right has not been authoritatively confirmed. See Nat’l
Aeronautics & Space Admin. v. Nelson, 562 U.S. 134, 138 (2011) (assuming, without
deciding, that employees had a right to informational privacy).
83. Intrusion on seclusion is one of four privacy torts recognized in the Restatement
(Second) of Torts § 652B (Am. L. Inst. 1977). The other three privacy torts are public disclosure of private fact, id. § 652D; appropriation of another’s name or likeness, id. § 652C;
and publicity that unreasonably places another in a false light, id. § 652E.
84. Restatement of Emp. L. § 7.01 Reporters’ Notes cmt. b, at 296–98 (Am. L. Inst.
2015) (discussing states that have adopted the privacy torts).
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who filed a workers’ compensation claim;85 deploying informants to
collect private information about fellow workers;86 searching a locker
and personal belongings without consent;87 and installing cameras in
bathrooms or private offices.88 To be actionable, the employer’s conduct
must be intentional, must intrude upon the employee’s reasonable
expectation of privacy, and must be considered “highly offensive to the
reasonable person.”89
Although the intrusion tort has successfully protected workers
against egregious employer practices in the past, it is less likely to be
effective in protecting employee privacy when large amounts of data
are scooped up to feed AI systems.90 The type of data collected is often
not the kind of information that is considered private or sensitive in
nature, such that its collection would be considered highly offensive.
Instead, it is often relatively mundane bits of data that employees produce as they go about their work or daily lives that get its invasive
power only when aggregated with other data. In addition, employers
will often be able to argue that this data is the type of information
that businesses routinely collect, and courts have been fairly deferential when the employer asserts a business interest justifying the intrusion.91 If the data collection and use ultimately improve the employees’
performance or the employer’s underlying business, the employer’s
actions are likely to be adjudged prudent rather than nefarious.
The intrusion tort is also unlikely to provide employees with much
protection because most employees are employed at will, such that
their continued employment can be conditioned on consent to data
collection and use. Employee consent will not always defeat claims of
privacy intrusion,92 but consent is generally regarded as a defense to

85. See, e.g., York v. Gen. Elec. Co., 759 N.E.2d 865 (Ohio Ct. App. 2001).
86. See, e.g., Johnson v. K-Mart Corp., 723 N.E.2d 1192 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000).
87. See, e.g., K-Mart Corp. Store No. 7441 v. Trotti, 677 S.W.2d 632, 640–41 (Tex.
App. 1984).
88. See, e.g., Elmore v. Atl. Zayre, Inc., 341 S.E.2d 905, 906-907 (Ga. Ct. App. 1986)
(bathroom); Hernandez v. Hillsides, Inc., 211 P.3d 1063, 1073 (Cal. 2009) (office).
89. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652B (Am. L. Inst. 1977).
90. Pauline T. Kim, Data Mining and the Challenges of Protecting Employee Privacy
Under U.S. Law, 40 Comp. Lab. L. & Pol’y J. 405, 416 (2019) (explaining that the common
law tort doctrine “does not address how data mining can threaten privacy by inferring
highly personal information rather than collecting it directly”).
91. See Feminist Women’s Health Ctr. v. Super. Ct. of Sacramento Cnty., 61 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 187, 195 (Ct. App. 3d 1997) (finding that a requirement that employees demonstrate self-cervical exams to clients of the Center was not a privacy intrusion because of
the employer’s “fundamental goal of educating women about the function and health of
their reproductive systems”).
92. Restatement of Emp. L., § 7.06 cmt. h (Am. L. Inst. 2015) (“In the employment
context, employee consent obtained as a condition of obtaining or retaining employment
is not effective consent to an employer intrusion and does not in itself provide a defense
. . . .”).
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intentional tort claims.93 Even if consent does not waive the employees’ rights completely, it still undercuts the “highly offensive” aspect
of the claim, as the employee agreed to the intrusion. The expanding
ubiquity of employer monitoring also erodes the privacy expectation of
employees, making it less likely to be considered an intrusion in the
first place.94
In terms of worker surveillance, the employer is generally allowed
to monitor its employees.95 Even continual electronic observation is
permitted in many areas of the workplace.96 The states of California,
Connecticut, and Delaware require employers to give notice when they
engage in electronic monitoring.97 And, as discussed above, surveillance
in traditionally private places like bathrooms or employees’ homes can
give rise to tort liability. The National Labor Relations Act prohibits
employer surveillance that would chill or otherwise interfere with its
employees’ protected concerted activity.98 However, apart from these
laws, employers are generally unrestricted in their ability to monitor
or surveil their employees, including using electronic tools to collect
data about their activities.
The common law has determined that surveillance can be tortious
when conducted at personal locations away from work when done without the employee’s consent.99 However, observation of an employee in
93. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 892A(1); see Steven L. Willborn, Consenting Employees: Workplace Privacy and the Role of Consent, 66 La. L. Rev. 975, 1008
(2006) (arguing for the importance of the concept of consent within workplace privacy
protections).
94. Restatement of Emp. L. § 7.03(b) (describing the conditions for finding a reasonable expectation of privacy).
95. See Ajunwa, Crawford & Schultz, supra note 22, at 747 (“There are no federal
laws that expressly address employer surveillance or limit the intrusiveness of such
surveillance.”).
96. See, e.g., Vega-Rodriguez v. P.R. Tel. Co., 110 F.3d 174, 184 (1st Cir. 1997) (permitting the use of cameras to continually surveil the employees’ work space).
97. California makes it a misdemeanor to use an electronic tracking device to follow
the location or movement of a person without her consent. Cal. Penal Code § 637.7 (West
2019); see also Kendra Rosenberg, Location Surveillance by GPS: Balancing an Employer’s Business Interest with Employee Privacy, 6 Wash. J.L. Tech. & Arts 143, 149 (2010).
Connecticut requires employers to provide prior written notice of the monitoring, Conn.
Gen. Stat. § 31-48d(b)(1) (2020); Gerardi v. City of Bridgeport, 985 A.2d 328, 335 (Conn.
2010) (prohibiting an employer from electronically monitoring an employee’s activities
without prior notice). Delaware requires advance written notice that the employee must
then acknowledge. Del. Code Ann. tit. 19, § 705 (2020).
98. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1); see Charlotte Garden, Labor Organizing in the Age of Surveillance, 63 St. Louis Univ. L.J. 55, 60 (2018) (noting that “certain surveillance activities
by employers have been illegal since the earliest days of the NLRA”).
99. See Ass’n Servs., Inc. v. Smith, 549 S.E.2d 454, 463 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001) (employer
trespassed onto employee property); Saldana v. Kelsey-Hayes Co., 443 N.W.2d 382, 384
(Mich. Ct. App. 1989) (finding intrusion (but no liability) when investigator took pictures
inside employee’s home using a telephoto lens); see also Pemberton v. Bethlehem Steel
Corp., 502 A.2d 1101, 1117 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1986) (holding that the use of a listening
device within personal areas is generally actionable); Burns v. Masterbrand Cabinets,
Inc., 874 N.E.2d 72, 77 (Ill. App. 2007) (remanding for further proceedings on intrusion
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public is permitted.100 Federal law forbids an employer from intercepting an employee’s telephone or other electronic communications, even
from the employer’s phone, without specific consent.101 Surveillance can
be legally problematic under the common law if undisclosed, but secrecy
is generally permissible when employed for significant and legitimate
business reasons, such as to catch a thief.102 Once again, data collection
is generally permitted if disclosed to employees, and they consent.
Protections for Specific Types of Data. Beyond these general privacy protections are variegated statutory and regulatory provisions
that protect specific types of data. However, because these provisions
focus on particular kinds of information that are deemed sensitive in
some way, they provide only very patchy protections against comprehensive data collection.
No law broadly regulates the privacy of employees’ health information, although the ADA limits employers’ ability to conduct medical exams or make medical inquiries, and the Genetic Information
Nondisclosure Act (GINA) prohibits employers from requesting or
acquiring employees’ genetic information.103 Although many assume
that the federal Health Information Portability and Accountability
Act (HIPAA)104 protects employee medical information, HIPAA only
claim when the employer’s investigator secretly videotaped an employee in his home
after gaining entry on false pretenses).
100. See, e.g., ICU Investigations, Inc. v. Jones, 780 So. 2d 685, 693 (Ala. 2000) (no
intrusion when videotaped in front yard); York v. Gen. Elec. Co., 759 N.E.2d 865, 866
(Ohio Ct. App. 2001) (no intrusion when employer representative observed the employee
arriving at work, going into his chiropractor’s office, visiting a lawnmower repair shop,
mowing his lawn, and riding a motorcycle).
101. See 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (criminalizing the actions of a person who “intentionally
intercepts, endeavors to intercept, or procures any other person to intercept or endeavor
to intercept, any wire, oral, or electronic communication”). The intercept is not illegal if
one of the parties (namely, the employee) consents to it. Id. § 2511(2)(c). However, courts
have not been disposed to find implied consent. Watkins v. L.M. Berry, 704 F.2d 577, 581
(11th Cir. 1983) (notice as to employer policy of interception did not establish consent).
Furthermore, a “business extension” exception allows for monitoring “in the ordinary
course of business.” 18 U.S.C. § 2510(5)(a)(i). However, listening in to personal calls is not
generally within the ordinary course of business. See Watkins, 704 F.2d at 583. Wiretapping is also problematic under state common law. See Narducci v. Village of Bellwood, 444
F. Supp. 2d 924, 938 (N.D. Ill. 2006) (“Eavesdropping via wiretapping has been conspicuously singled out on several occasions as precisely the kind of conduct that gives rise to
an intrusion-on-seclusion claim.”).
102. See Marrs v. Marriott Corp., 830 F. Supp. 274, 283 (D. Md. 1992) (permitting
secret videotaping after hours to uncover thief); Sacramento Cty. Deputy Sheriffs’ Assoc.
v. County of Sacramento, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d 834, 847 (Ct. App. 1997) (theft of inmates’
property justified secret surveillance). But see Acuff v. IBP, Inc., 77 F. Supp. 2d 914, 927
(C.D. Ill. 1999) (videotaping nurse’s office during medical exams not justified by concerns
about theft).
103. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d) (ADA limitation on examinations); 42 U.S.C. § 2000ff–1(b)
(making it “an unlawful employment practice for an employer to request, require, or
purchase genetic information with respect to an employee”).
104. Health Information Portability and Accountability Act, Pub. L. No. 104-191,
110 Stat. 1936 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26, 29, and 42 U.S.C.).
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applies to health plans, health care providers, and health care clearinghouses.105 Employers are not covered entities unless they fall into
one of these categories.106 And, even if they are covered, employers need
not comply with HIPAA when it comes to records held in their role as
employer.107 If the information does fall under HIPAA, patient authorization generally provides permission to collect and use the protected
health information.108
Illinois provides a private right of action for improper collection,
retention, or use of biometric data such as fingerprints or facial scans
in the Biometric Information Privacy Act (BIPA).109 Although the BIPA
allows employers to collect biometric information with employee consent, the statutory scheme also provides a number of protections and
limitations on the use of the data. Employers have been sued for failing
to notify employees about the purpose and length of the data’s use;
neglecting to establish a timeline for destruction of the data; and failing to obtain employee consent for disclosure or dissemination of the
biometric data to a third party.110 Other states have also begun to enact
limitations on the collection and use of biometric data, although it is
not always clear if these state statutes apply to employment, and many
do not provide private rights of action.111 Like the BIPA, these statutes

105. 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2020) (defining covered entity as a health plan, a health
care clearinghouse, or a health care provider).
106. See id. §§ 164.103, 164.105; Sharona Hoffman, Employing E-Health: The
Impact of Electronic Health Records on the Workplace, 19 Kan. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 409, 419
(2010) (“Employers who are self-insured can receive medical information from providers
for payment purposes without their employees’ authorization. Such employers are considered ‘hybrid’ entities whose business activities include both covered (insurance) and
non-covered (employment) functions.”).
107. See 45 C.F.R. § 160.103. In addition, covered entities may provide employee
health information to employers in order “[t]o evaluate whether the individual has a
work-related illness or injury.” Id. § 164.512(b)(v)(A)(2); see also id. § 164.504(f) (noting
that as a condition of providing the information, the covered entity must require the
employer to protect the information and not use it for employment-related actions).
108. What Is the Difference Between “Consent” and “Authorization” Under the
HIPAA Privacy Rule?, U.S. Dep’t Health & Hum. Servs. (2013), https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa
/for-professionals/faq/264/what-is-the-difference-between-consent-and-authorization
/index.html [https://perma.cc/B64H-APE5].
109. Biometric Information Privacy Act, 740 Ill. Comp. Stat. §§ 14/1–/99 (2018).
110. Corrado Rizzi, Illinois Wendy’s Operator Hit with BIPA Class Action over
Employee Fingerprint Scans, ClassAction.org (Oct. 11, 2019), https://www.classaction
.org/news/illinois-wendys-operator-hit-with-bipa-class-action-over-employee-fingerprint-scans [https://perma.cc/PSQ9-BCG6] (describing O’Sullivan v. All-Star, Inc., No.
2019CH11575, filed in the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois, on Oct. 7, 2019). Thirdparty vendors may also be liable to employees for failing to obtain consent. Figueroa v.
Kronos, Inc., 454 F. Supp. 3d 772, 782 (N.D. Ill. 2020).
111. See, e.g., Tex. Bus. & Com. Code Ann. § 503.001 (West 2019) (requiring consent
for the capture of a biometric identifier and sale of biometric data, as well as reasonable
care in storage and disposal, but without a private right of action); Wash. Rev. Code
§19.375.020 (2019) (regulating use of biometric data in commercial databases and foregoing a private right of action).
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are narrowly limited in the types of information that are protected and
apply only within the state’s borders.
The federal Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) regulates employers’
access to applicants’ or employees’ credit reports. The statute requires
employers to get written authorization to obtain employee credit
reports; employers must also notify employees if the credit report is used
to take adverse action against them.112 The FCRA applies only when
employers receive or use consumer reports from consumer reporting
agencies, but the term consumer report is construed broadly to include
any information that goes to “character, general reputation, personal
characteristics, or mode of living.”113 Because the FCRA largely focuses
on procedural requirements of notice and consent, employers can generally avoid liability under the Act if they comply with the details of
the statutory scheme.114
Although relatively narrow in scope, state statutes also regulate
the use of specific types of information within the employment relationship. Twenty-six states have laws prohibiting employers from requesting access to applicants’ or employees’ private social-media accounts.115
And a number of states and municipalities have passed “ban the box”
laws that prohibit employers from requesting information about prior
arrests or convictions at certain early points in the hiring process.116
Artificial intelligence that relies on employee data also raises concerns about the security of the data that has been collected. The ADA
and GINA require employers to keep any medical or genetic information they lawfully acquired in a secure and confidential manner.117
112. See Fair Credit Reporting Act of 1970, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681b(b)(1)–(3), 1681m; see
also N.Y. Fair Credit Reporting Act, N.Y. Gen. Bus. L. § 380-b (2020) (regulating the use
of credit reports).
113. 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(d)(1).
114. See Pauline T. Kim & Erika Hanson, People Analytics and the Regulation of
Information Under the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 61 St. Louis Univ. L.J. 17, 20 (2016)
(“[A]lthough employers face significant liability risks if they disregard the statute’s
requirements, the FCRA in fact does little to curb invasive data collection practices or to
address the risks of discriminatory algorithms.”).
115. See, e.g., Ark. Code Ann. § 11-2-124 (2019); Cal. Labor Code § 980 (2019);
Colo. Rev. Stat. § 8-2-127 (2019); 820 Ill. Comp. Stat. § 55/10 (2018); La. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 51:1953 (2018); Md. Code Ann., Lab. & Emp. § 3-712 (2019); Mich. Comp. Laws § 37.273
(2018); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 613.135 (2019); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 275:74 (2018); N.J. Stat.
Ann. § 34:6B-5 (2019); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 50-4-34 (2019); Okla. Stat. tit. 40, § 173.2 (2018);
Or. Rev. Stat. § 659A.330 (2019); 28 R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-56-3 (2018); Tenn. Code Ann.
§ 50-1-1003 (West 2019); Utah Code Ann. § 34-48-201 (West 2019); Wash. Rev. Code §
49.44.200 (2019); Wis. Stat. § 995.55 (2019). Roughly half of the states had such legislation under consideration. See Access to Social Media Usernames and Passwords, Nat’l
Conf. of State Legislatures (July 1, 2020), http://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and-information-technology/employer-access-to-social-media-passwords-2013.
aspx [https://perma.cc/6X5P-KVFA].
116. See, e.g., Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151B, § 4(9), (9A) (2018); see also Dallan F. Flake,
Do Ban-the-Box Laws Really Work?, 104 Iowa L. Rev. 1079, 1079 (2019) (providing empirical examination of ban-the-box laws).
117. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(3)(B); 42 U.S.C. § 2000-ff(a).
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All fifty states have data breach notification laws that would apply
to employers when a data breach involves employee personal data.118
Statutory schemes such as HIPAA and Illinois BIPA impose security
requirements on certain types of information.119 Tort claims against
employers for faulty or negligent data security systems have met with
mixed success.120
2.	Protecting Workplace Privacy under a Data
Protection Framework
American law has tended to follow a privacy rights approach that
focuses on prohibiting particular types of intrusions or shielding certain kinds of information, but this framework has created only limited
restrictions on employers’ ability to collect data about applicants and
workers. In Europe, however, the focus has been on data protection
more broadly, relying on principles that apply across sectors and types
of information. The data protection model of the European Union (EU)
aims to restrict the collection, use, and disclosure of personal information except where justified, and does so by creating rights in individual data subjects to enforce those restrictions. The EU’s General Data
Protection Regulation (GDPR) is a paradigmatic example of a comprehensive data protection regime.121 Its scope, requirements for processing data, and muscular enforcement regime empower individuals with
important rights over the use of their data.122
118. Security Breach Notification Laws, Nat’l Conf. of State Legislatures (July 17,
2020), https://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and-information-technology
/security-breach-notification-laws.aspx [https://perma.cc/8PX7-DFTS].
119. HIPAA regulations require that covered entities “protect against any reasonably anticipated threats or hazards to the security or integrity” of protected health information. 45 C.F.R. § 164.306(a)(2) (2020); 740 Ill. Comp. Stat. 14/5 (2008).
120. See Corona v. Sony Pictures Entm’t, Inc., No. 14-CV-09600 RGK EX, 2015 WL
3916744, at *1 (C.D. Cal. June 15, 2015) (class-action lawsuit filed against Sony Pictures for failing to prevent hack of 100 terabytes of employee data). The suit was settled.
Assoc. Press, Sony Pictures Settles with Former Workers in Data Breach Lawsuit, Wall
St. J. (Sept. 2, 2015, 8:49 PM ET), http://www.wsj.com/articles/sony-pictures-settles-with
-former-workers-in-data-breach-lawsuit-1441241363 [https://perma.cc/VC32-W5TX]. But
see Bodah v. Lakeville Motor Express, Inc., 663 N.W.2d 550, 558 (Minn. 2003) (finding
no liability when social security numbers were faxed out to sixteen different business
locations); Allison v. Aetna, Inc., No. 09–2560, 2010 WL 3719243 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 9, 2010)
(dismissing complaint for lack of standing due to the absence of any injury in fact to
employees after data breach).
121. Regulation 2016/679, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27
April 2016 on the Protection of Natural Persons with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, and Repealing Directive 95/46/
EC (General Data Protection Regulation), 2016 O.J. (L 119) (EU) [hereinafter GDPR].
An easily accessible version of the GDPR can be found at Intersoft Consulting, GDPR,
https://gdpr-info.eu/. The GDPR is intended to protect “fundamental rights and freedoms
of natural persons and in particular their right to the protection of personal data.” Id.
art. 1(2).
122. See, e.g., Anupam Chander, Margot E. Kaminski & William McGeveran, Catalyzing Privacy Law, 105 Minn. L. Rev. 1733, 1734 (2021) (noting that the GDPR “positioned the European Union as the world’s privacy champion”).
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The GDPR applies to all processing of personal data,123 including
by employers. The broad definition of personal data124 means that all
information collected by an employer about applicants and employees
is covered as long as it is connected to an identifiable person. Any processing—including collection, use, or disclosure—of personal data must
have a legal justification.125 Although data processing can be justified
by the consent of the data subject in certain circumstances, consent
is not considered valid “where there is a clear imbalance between the
data subject and the controller.”126 The employment relationship is
understood to be one example of such a “clear imbalance.”127 Employer
collection and use of employee data must therefore be justified by basic
requirements of the work relationship or the legitimate needs of the
employer, rather than by relying on consent.
Where the processing of employee data is necessary, the GDPR
asks employers to take steps to mitigate the effects on employees—for
example, by monitoring only in specific places and not sensitive areas,
or collecting data by sampling rather than continuous monitoring.128
The EU privacy agency’s guidance on the workplace provides examples of illegitimate employer uses of employee data: when monitoring
123. GDPR, supra note 121, art. 3(1) (applying to “the processing of personal data
in the context of the activities of an establishment of a controller or a processor in the
Union, regardless of whether the processing takes place in the Union or not”); id. art.
4(2) (defining processing to mean “any operation or set of operations which is performed
on personal data or on sets of personal data, whether or not by automated means, such
as collection, recording, organisation, structuring, storage, adaptation or alteration,
retrieval, consultation, use, disclosure by transmission, dissemination or otherwise making available, alignment or combination, restriction, erasure or destruction”).
124. Id. art. 4(1) (defining personal data to mean “any information relating to an
identified or identifiable natural person (‘data subject’); an identifiable natural person is
one who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by reference to an identifier
such as a name, an identification number, location data, an online identifier or to one or
more factors specific to the physical, physiological, genetic, mental, economic, cultural or
social identity of that natural person”).
125. Id. art. 6. The GDPR lists a number of specified criteria for lawful processing
of personal data. Id.
126. Id. Recital 43(1). Recitals are nonbinding but offer important guidance. See
Margot E. Kaminski, The Right to Explanation, Explained, 34 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 189,
193–94 (2019) (“The GDPR consists of both text (Articles) and an extensive explanatory
preamble. The preambular provisions, known as Recitals, do not have the direct force of
law in the EU. . . . [T]hey are not binding law, but they are often cited as authoritative
interpretations where the GDPR is vague.”).
127. In its interpretive guidance of the GDPR as applied to the workplace, the Article 29 Working Party—the earlier title for the European Union agency responsible for
data protection—stated that “for the majority of such data processing at work, the legal
basis cannot and should not be the consent of the employees (Art [6](a)) due to the nature
of the relationship between employer and employee.” Article 29 Data Protection Working
Party, Opinion 2/2017 on Data Processing at Work, 17/EN WP 249 (June 8, 2017), http://
ec.europa.eu/newsroom/document.cfm?doc_id=45631 [hereinafter WP Work Opinion].
The Article 29 Working Party is now known as the European Data Protection Board.
GDPR, supra note 121, art. 68.
128. WP Work Opinion, supra note 127, at 7–8.
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designed to protect employee safety is used for job-evaluation purposes;
when a CCTV system is used to regularly monitor employee behavior;
or when geolocation data is used to continuously track an employee’s
movements and actions.129
The GDPR also gives data subjects two sets of rights: rights to
know about the processing, and rights to affect the processing. Data
processors, including employers, are required to disclose information
about the processing in clear and accessible language.130 This information includes the categories of data collected, the purpose of and legal
basis for the processing, how the data will be used and/or disclosed,
and the procedures for challenging these processes.131 Rights affecting
data processing include the right to correct inaccurate data, the right
to supplement incomplete data,132 and the right to request deletion of
data under some circumstances.133
The GDPR thus represents a very different model for the regulation of employee data collection and use. It is comprehensive in
scope, requires specific justifications for data collection, limits data
use beyond the original purpose, and provides individuals with specific
rights regarding the collection and use of their personal data. Although
the GDPR applies to data about individuals located in the EU, it is having significant impact worldwide. In part, its influence arises from the
fact that data flows often are not limited by political boundaries, but
the GDPR also sets an example that influences lawmaking elsewhere.
In the United States, it has been suggested as a blueprint for federal
privacy legislation and has already influenced state law. The California
Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA), which went into effect in 2020, provides
important notification requirements on the collection and processing
of personal data, as well as the right to delete certain data and opt out
of third party transfers.134 Voters passed the California Privacy Rights
Act (CPRA) in fall 2020; the CPRA will enhance consumers’ ability to
correct inaccurate information, limit the use of sensitive data, expand
the private right of action, and create an independent state agency for
privacy regulation.135 Both of these Acts, however, have limited impact
129. Id. at 10.
130. GDPR, supra note 121, art. 12.
131. Id. art. 13, 15.
132. Id. art. 16.
133. Id. art. 17(1). Exceptions apply for information that involves freedom of expression, public health, or research/archiving. Id. art. 17(3). The controller must also provide
data subjects with the right to a portable version of the data, in a commonly-used and
machine-readable format, when the processing is automated and conducted pursuant to
the data subject’s consent or contract. Id. art. 20.
134. Cal. Civ. Code § 1798.140(o) (West 2020).
135. The California Privacy Rights Act of 2020, Proposition 24 (Cal. 2020). In March
2021 Virginia passed a consumer privacy statute similar to but less restrictive than
the CCPA. Virginia Consumer Data Protection Act, H.B. 2307, S.B. 1392 (Va. Mar. 2,
2021), https://lis.virginia.gov/cgi-bin/legp604.exe?212+sum+HB2307; Cat Zakrzewski,
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on employment; the CCPA currently has a specific exception that
excludes employee data from coverage.136
Following the EU’s data protection model would be a dramatic
departure from the current U.S. approach to employee privacy. Only a
patchwork of laws currently restrict employers’ ability to collect data
from and about their employees. Employers in the United States face
only limited prohibitions on the collection of employee data, and comparatively miniscule restrictions on how they use data once it has been
collected. They may not use information about individual workers to
discriminate on the basis of protected characteristics or to retaliate
against them for exercising statutory rights, but, beyond that, employers are generally free to use the information they have about employees
however they wish. They may aggregate and analyze worker data to
infer new information about their employees.137 And U.S. law generally
neither limits employers to only using data for the purpose for which it
was collected nor requires that they ensure the accuracy of the data.138
B.

AI Accountability and Transparency in the Workplace
Distinct from employees’ interests in limiting collection and use
of their personal information is the growing push for greater transparency, accountability, and explainability in algorithmic processes.139
Although not part of traditional “privacy” concerns, these values are
Virginia Governor Signs Nation’s Second State Consumer Privacy Bill, Wash. Post
(Mar. 2, 2021 7:17 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2021/03/02/privacy
-tech-data-virgina.
136. Cal. Civ. Code § 1798.145(m)(1) (excluding personal information collected “by
a business about a natural person in the course of the natural person acting as . . . an
employee of . . . that business”). This exclusion is set to expire on January 1, 2023. Id.
§ 1798.145(m)(4). The CCPA still requires the employer to provide notice of data collection to its employees; this notice must include the type of personal information collected
and its intended use. See id. §§ 1798.145(m)(3); 1798.100(b). And employers must adequately protect data they collect, as employees may bring suit in the event of a data
breach. See id. §§ 1798.145(m)(3); 1798.150(a)(1).
137. For example, relatively trivial information can reveal sensitive information
such as whether an individual is pregnant or trying to conceive. In one example, Target used a wide variety of personal data—both generated by the store and purchased
from external vendors—to develop consumer profiles including particular needs such
as a pregnancy. Charles Duhigg, How Your Shopping Habits Reveal Even the Most Personal Information, N.Y. Times, Feb. 19, 2012, (Mag.), at 1. Employers have successfully
developed similar profiles. Valentina Zarya, Employers Are Quietly Using Big Data to
Track Employee Pregnancies, Forbes (Feb. 17, 2016), http://fortune.com/2016/02/17/cast
light-pregnancy-data [https://perma.cc/TK37-YF3U].
138. Matthew T. Bodie, Miriam A. Cherry, Marcia L. McCormick & Jintong Tang,
The Law & Policy of People Analytics, 88 Univ. Colo. L. Rev. 961, 1001–02 (2017). The
U.S. government is restricted as to secondary uses of data. See, e.g., Privacy Act of 1974,
5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(3)(B). The FCRA does regulate use but its requirements are largely
procedural. See Kim & Hanson, supra note 114, at 33 (arguing that the FCRA is “ill
equipped to . . . curb the use of unfair or discriminatory algorithms”).
139. FPF Expert’s Guide, supra note 5, at 22.
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partially addressed through broader approaches to data regulation.140
Moreover, these values resonate with employee concerns about the
increasing use of AI within the workplace. It is not just that data is
constantly vacuumed from employees; it is that the data is then put to
use to make decisions about them that can appear arbitrary or severe,
with no opportunity for employee recourse.141 Their vulnerability to
observation and scrutiny thus heightens their vulnerability to capricious and sudden managerial discretion. Workers can feel that they are
cogs within a massive and impersonal machine.
U.S. law currently does little to ensure the accountability and
transparency of artificial intelligence.142 If anything, it reinforces the
hidden nature of AI processes through trade secret protections.143
Some reformers have proposed that AI processes be accountable and
made transparent through mandates requiring entities that use these
systems to conduct algorithmic impact assessments (AIA).144 Others
have argued that incentivizing the use of more appropriate and less
error-ridden algorithmic tools may be preferable to creating new individual rights to challenge machine decisions.145 But, although proposed
legislation has included transparency and accountability requirements,
currently no American laws comprehensively regulate the use of AI in
decision-making.
Once again, the GDPR suggests an alternative model. It specifically addresses AI decision-making by requiring disclosure of automated decision-systems and restricting their use, even allowing data
subjects to opt out of fully automated profiling. Article 22 states, “The
data subject shall have the right not to be subject to a decision based
solely on automated processing, including profiling, which produces

140. See Calo, supra note 1, at 424 (“Why label the question of asymmetric access to
data a ‘privacy’ question? I do so because privacy ultimately governs the set of responsible policy outcomes that arise in response to the data parity problem.”).
141. See id. at 423 (“Again, the privacy conversation has evolved to focus not on the
capacity of the individual to protect their data, but on the power over an individual or
group that comes from knowing so much about them.”).
142. See Kaminski, supra note 126, at 191–92 (noting that the literature on AI in
the United States “has been largely speculative, operating in a policy vacuum”).
143. See, e.g., Pasquale, supra note 2, at 12–15; Rebecca Wexler, Life, Liberty, and
Trade Secrets: Intellectual Property in the Criminal Justice System, 70 Stan. L. Rev. 1343,
1353 (2018) (arguing against companies invoking trade secret law to avoid scrutiny of
their AI by criminal defendants).
144. Dillon Reisman, Jason Schultz, Kate Crawford & Meredith Whittaker,
AI Now, Algorithmic Impact Assessments: A Practical Framework for Public Agency
Accountability 16 (2018), https://ainowinstitute.org/aiareport2018.pdf [https://perma.cc
/Y7V4-FWE2].
145. See, e.g., Huq, supra note 2, at 687 (arguing that a “well-calibrated machine
decision maker may have underappreciated advantages that sound in dignity and autonomy terms”).
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legal effects concerning him or her or similarly significantly affects
him or her.”146 Profiling is described as
any form of automated processing of personal data evaluating the
personal aspects relating to a natural person, in particular to analyse or predict aspects concerning the data subject’s performance at
work, economic situation, health, personal preferences or interests,
reliability or behaviour, location or movements, where it produces
legal effects concerning him or her or similarly significantly affects
him or her.147

The restriction does have two significant exceptions: one if the processing is necessary to performance of a contract, and another if the
individual gives “explicit consent.”148 While these exceptions seem to
relieve employers of the requirements of Article 22, they are not as
broad in the employment context as they may appear. “Necessary” to
contractual performance means that the performance must be impossible without the automated processing, and, as discussed earlier, the
consent exception is generally unavailable to employers.149 Given the
newness of the GDPR, and in particular the protections in Article 22,150
it remains to be seen how potent this right will be in restricting the use
of predictive AI. It is possible that entities that use machine learning
(ML) tools will simply put a human nominally in charge at the end
of the process to rubber-stamp the decision in order to argue that the
decision is not “based solely on automated processing” and therefore
falls outside the regulation.151
Employees arguably have a stronger interest in challenging automated processing than consumers, because they are more likely to
feel its effects keenly when it is used to manage and discipline them.
146. GDPR, supra note 121, art. 12(1).
147. Id. Recital 71.
148. Id. art. 12(2).
149. Lee A. Bygrave, Article 22 Automated Individual Decision-Making, Including Profiling, in The EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR): A Commentary
§ C.4.3, at 522, 537 (Christopher Kuner, Lee A. Bygrave & Christopher Docksey eds.,
2020) (noting that Article 22’s consent derogation “must otherwise be applied in light of
the definition of consent in Article 4(11)”).
150. Id. § A, at 526 (“The travaux préparatoires to the GDPR provide scant explanation of the rationale and policy underpinnings for Article 22.”).
151. See, e.g., What Does the GDPR Say About Automated Decision-Making and
Profiling?, U.K. Info. Comm’r’s Off., https://ico.org.uk/for-organisations/guide-to-data
-protection/guide-to-the-general-data-protection-regulation-gdpr/automated-decision
-making-and-profiling/what-does-the-gdpr-say-about-automated-decision-making-and
-profiling [https://perma.cc/P5KP-JEJ8] (“Solely means a decision-making process that
is totally automated and excludes any human influence on the outcome. . . . A process
won’t be considered solely automated if someone weighs up and interprets the result of
an automated decision before applying it to the individual.”).
For a discussion of “human in the loop” systems, see Ge Wang, Humans in the Loop:
The Design of Interactive AI Systems, Stanford HAI (Oct. 20, 2019), https://hai.stanford
.edu/blog/humans-loop-design-interactive-ai-systems [https://perma.cc/5VJC-TMTE]
(discussing systems that incorporate human judgment within the process).
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However, current U.S. law offers no clear vehicles for raising such
challenges. So far, legal reform and enforcement efforts have largely
focused on consumer interests, as seen in recent consumer-focused
state privacy statutes and the Federal Trade Commission’s consumeroriented enforcement against unfair trade practices. Even if the law
were to create stronger data protection rights for workers, they may
not be able to effectively assert those rights in the absence of effective
vehicles for them to exercise voice and power in the workplace. Thus,
meaningful protections of employees’ privacy and autonomy interests
around predictive AI tools will likely require not only legal change, but
enhanced worker power through collective activity as well.
Conclusion
Current U.S. law is ill-equipped to manage the challenges posed by
the increasing use of artificial intelligence within the workplace. While
some existing legal rules shield workers from discrimination and protect employee privacy and autonomy, the law lacks a comprehensive
framework for addressing the particular risks of harm posed when
machine learning tools are applied to manage workers. As AI becomes
more integrated and essential to business, the law will need to adapt in
order to effectively prevent discrimination, protect privacy, and redress
concerns about worker alienation and loss of personal security.
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